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Abstract. Automated negotiation can be an efficient method for resolv-
ing conflict and redistributing resources in a coalition setting. Automated
negotiation has already seen increased usage in fields such as e-commerce
and power distribution in smart girds, and recent advancements in op-
ponent modelling have proven to deliver better outcomes. However, sig-
nificant barriers to more widespread adoption remain, such as lack of
predictable outcome over time and user trust. Additionally, there have
been many recent advancements in the field of reasoning about uncer-
tainty, which could help alleviate both those problems. As there is no
recent survey on these two fields, and specifically not on their possible
intersection we aim to provide such a survey here.
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1 Introduction
Negotiation is an important method of conflict resolution and resource alloca-
tion in multi-agent systems. In this survey I will focus on bilateral negotiations,
meaning negotiations with only two parties, but many of the techniques will
also be applicable to multilateral negotiations. The current state of the art in
automated negotiation places a lot of emphasis on Proposal Based Negotiation
(PBN) [4] which will be explained in more detail in Section 2.1. This means
that the only method of communication the protocol allows is either accepting
a previous proposal, offering a counter-proposal or terminating the negotiation
altogether.
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Work has already been done to develop negotiation support systems (NSS)
[20] and verify that they do transfer benefits to the user when used [18,24,38].
Since emotion can have big impacts on how people act both inside and out-
side negotiations, affective computation, that is computation relating to human
emotion, could potentially be worthwhile integrating into NSS. In fact, authors
such as Broekens, Jonker and Meyer [7] assert that integrating useful affective
computation into NSS is possible in the short term (several years). Despite this
work, however, as identified by Baarslag et. al. in [5], and by Pommeranz et. al.
in [29] adoption of autonomous negotiation agents and NSS systems still faces
significant challenges. Baarslag et. al. [5] identify three main challenges to more
widespread adoption:
1. Necessity for domain knowledge and difficulty of preference elicitation
2. Long-term perspective (having non-stationary preferences and performing
well over multiple encounters)
3. User trust
They identify that the absence of predictable outcome and transparent prefer-
ence elicitation form a major barrier to overcome, especially to non specialist
users. They also mention that there exists a tension between predictability and
performance, since if an agent is predictable to its adversary, it becomes ex-
ploitable, meaning that an agent should be predictable but only to the user.
They mention that this can be alleviated by, amongst others, quantifying uncer-
tainty. Therefore, it is my hypothesis that it is beneficial to focus on incorpo-
rating models of computation that can inspire more user trust by providing the
following:
1. Explanations for the agent’s beliefs and actions
2. Certain guarantees or quantifying the risk of certain outcomes occurring
3. Assessments of how likely an opponent is to honour the outcome of a nego-
tiation by measuring credible commitment
I argue that one way to achieve better transparent consequences is through
integrating a Reasoning About Uncertainty (RAU) approach into negotiations.
RAU is a well known and well-studied problem with a mature body of research
written about it [31,35,23,10,17]. RAU also often offers models that are in some
way more explainable than many other systems. User trust often not only has
to do with the outcome of a certain task but also the wider implications of that
outcome. Using methods such as probabilistic reasoning will allow an agent to
consider the wider implications and present these to the user. It is, therefore, my
belief that integrating an RAU approach into automated negotiation is a good
way to achieve the goals outlined above.
2 Basic Negotiation theory
In this section I will discuss relevant theory of automated negotiation, summaris-
ing work from [4,3,8,19,21,30,33]
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2.1 Negotiations
A high-concept illustration of the components of an automated negotiation is
depicted in Figure 1. The negotiation setting describes the entire negotiation. Its
main components are the agents, the negotiation protocol and the negotiation
scenario. We will discuss these elements in more detail below.
Negotiation	setting
Negotiation	scenario
Negotiation	
Domain
Preference	
Profile	A
Preference
Profile	B
Negotiation
Protocol
Agent	A Agent	BCommunicate
Fig. 1. An illustration of the elements defining an automated bilateral negotiation.
Reproduced from [4]
PBN Protocols The negotiation protocol details the methods of communica-
tion. In this work, it is assumed that both agents adhere to the same protocol.
One of the more well-known protocols is the Alternating-Offers Protocol (AOP).
In this protocol, the two agents take turns making offers, or bids to each other
until one of the agents accepts [4]. When we refer to Proposal Based Negotiation
(PBN) we refer to negotiations that utilise AOP. While the AOP is specifically
focused on bilateral negotiations, there are also versions for multilateral negoti-
ations. Such an example is the Stacked Alternating Offers Protocol (SAOP) [2]
where every agent can make a new proposal or choose to accept the most recent
proposal. In general, PBN can also refer to negotiations using a multilateral
version AOP (such as SAOP, but more exist), but those are not discussed here.
Of course, different protocols provide different benefits and disadvantages.
Therefore it is important and also non-trivial to choose the correct protocol for
framing a given problem. In [26] Marsa-Maestre et. al. provide rules-of-thumb
and strategies for matching a beneficial method of modelling the negotiation
based on the problem details, including which protocol to use.
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Negotiation scenarios The negotiation domain consists of the matters being
discussed in the negotiation, meaning that the domain comprises the semantic
part of the interaction. Formally we say that the negotiation domain, negotiation
space or outcome space, which is usually denoted as Ω, is the product of at least
one issue. An issue, denoted Λ, is a countable set whose elements are called
values. Each issue represents one matter that needs to be agreed upon, and the
values represent possible assignments. A proposal is a vector ω ∈ Ω, representing
a possible assignment to the issues being proposed.
The negotiation domain informs the preference profiles of the agents. An
ordinal preference profile is a linear preorder , meaning a linear ordering that
is not necessarily anti-symmetric, on the outcome space. We say that an agent
weakly prefers ω to ζ if ω  ζ. If in addition ζ  ω holds, we say that the agent
is indifferent towards the offers, which is written as ζ ∼ ω. If ω  ζ holds but
ζ  ω does not, then we say that ω is strictly or strongly preferred to ζ, and
write ω  ζ [30]. Finally, a proposal ρ is called Pareto optimal if it cannot be
improved upon for one agent without making it worse for another. More formally
this means that a proposal ρ is Pareto optimal if, whenever an agent prefers ζ
to ρ then the other agent prefers ρ to ζ. This is a measure of the efficiency of
an agreed proposal, because if a proposal is not Pareto optimal, there exists
an offer that all parties prefer or are indifferent to. The piece-wise linear curve
connecting all Pareto optimal solutions is called the Pareto frontier. An agent
may also specify a reservation value, which is the least favourable proposal that
is still preferable to ending the negotiation without an agreement [4].
Although an ordinal preference profile can be formulated by listing all of the
ordinal relationships, for large negotiation spaces this quickly becomes unwieldy.
A more common way of formulating a preference profile is by use of a utility
function. This is a function u : Ω → R, which assigns a numeric value to each
outcome which represents how much the agent appreciates that outcome. Every
utility function u induces a preference profile via the following relationship
ω  ζ ⇐⇒ u(ω) ≥ u(ζ). (1)
Such preference profiles are called cardinal preference profiles. Sometimes ad-
ditional assumptions are made about utility functions to help alleviate compu-
tational complexity but this almost always comes at the cost of expressiveness.
One common way of doing this is by using linear additive functions for which
it holds that for any ω ∈ Ω where Ω consists of n issues, the following equation
holds
u(ω) =
n∑
i=1
wiei(ωi) (2)
[4]. Here wi are normalised weights representing the relative importance of each
issue.
Time In the real world, negotiation is often very costly both because the issues
debated might be time sensitive (resources decaying for example) and because
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the act of negotiating itself requires resources. Therefore it is often desirable to
take into consideration the time needed to negotiate [8]. One common way to
model this is by using a time discounted utility. For a certain discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1] and t ∈ [0, 1] the normalised time this is defined as
uδ(ω) = u(ω) · δt. (3)
Here a small δ represents high time pressure and δ = 1 represents no time-
pressure. [4]
2.2 Success metrics
Measuring negotiation outcomes There are a variety of metrics commonly
used to assess the outcome of a negotiation:
– Average utility This is by far the most common metric used to assess the
efficiency of a negotiation agent. The average utility an agent can achieve is
indicative of its performance. This metric does have its limitations however,
since it can provide only a metric relative to a certain utility function, and
cannot provide a more general notion of performance. For example, if one
agent uses a utility function u and another uses the same strategy but uses
the utility function w(ω) = 10 · u(ω) they will make the same decisions but
the agent using w will in general appear to perform much better.
– Fairness of outcome In some negotiation settings, such as cooperation set-
tings, or setting where repeated interactions are likely, the fairness of an
outcome can be an important factor. Often this is characterised as the av-
erage distance to solutions that satisfy fairness characteristics such as the
Nash solution, or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Here the Nash solution is
defined as the bid which maximises the product of the utilities [4]:
ωNash = max
ω∈Ω
ua(ω) · ub(ω) (4)
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is defined as the Pareto optimal bid ω
for which the following equation holds:
umaxa
umaxb
=
ua(ω)
ub(ω)
(5)
meaning that each agent gets a utility proportional to their maximal possible
utility. The main difference between these measures is that Nash equilibria
are stable under removing irrelevant options from the domain, while the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution guarantees that if there are more resources to
divide, then agents won’t have their utility decreased by claiming them [22].
– Distance to Pareto frontier As I mentioned in Section 2.1, a Pareto bid is in
some ways maximally efficient because if a bid is not Pareto optimal, by def-
inition there exists a bid that is better for at least one agent and nobody will
have to concede. Therefore the average distance to the nearest Pareto bid is
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often used as a measure of the efficiency of an outcome. One problem with
analysing Pareto optimally is that it requires perfect information. However,
preference strategies and thus Pareto optimal bids can be estimated using
machine learning, which will be explored in more detail in section 2.4. Cal-
culating the Pareto frontier can be costly, especially since it suffers from the
curse of dimensionality. Genetic algorithms are often used to approximate it
such as in [21] but exact algorithms have also been proposed [19].
– Joint utility Another measure of fairness that is sometimes used is the joint
utility since this in some ways can compensate for exploitation. Many au-
thors simply use the sum of the utilities. However, this can have sensitivity
issues since it has trouble detecting unfair outcomes if the scale of the util-
ities greatly differs. Another possibility is to take the geometric mean of
the utilities, as shown in equation 6, which suffers less from the sensitivity
problem.
ujoint(ω) =
√
ua(ω) · ub(ω) (6)
– Robustness Especially when assessing the possible autonomy of an agent
and its long term viability, it is often important to consider its robustness.
Robustness is a measure of how easily the agent can be exploited by an ad-
versary switching tactics. Highly specialised agents can produce very good
outcomes but if they have no means of adapting, they can easily become ex-
ploitable by agents who have knowledge of the strategy [3]. Often robustness
is measured using some form of Empirical Game-Theoretic analysis (EGT),
sometimes also called Evolutionary Game Theoretic analysis. Examples of
works using this kind of analysis include [3] and [11]. EGT attempts to
provide insight into the robustness of agents by simulating many negotia-
tions among different agents while letting agents change strategies based on
the outcomes of the previous round of simulations. Robustness can then be
measured by observing the evolution of the distributions of the strategies
over time. Work has also been done recently by Tuyls et. al. [36] to prove
theoretical guarantees on an EGT analysis technique called meta-game anal-
ysis. This technique models higher level strategies using EGT instead of the
atomic actions.
– Time until agreement As stated earlier, many negotiations have some kind of
time pressure. In those scenarios it can be useful to measure the time until an
agreement is reached, if at all. Depending on the scenario, this time can be
measured in real time, or in the number of messages exchanged, which might
be more important in certain low bandwidth scenarios. One disadvantage
of this method is that it does not take the quality of the outcome of the
negotiation into account.
2.3 Argumentation based negotiation
In [33] Rahwan et. al. mention that models of PBNs tend to have several disad-
vantages. For example, usually it is assumed that the preference profile is static
and completely known prior to the interaction. This presents problems when
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agents have to negotiate more complex situations such as trade union negotia-
tions where the value of an outcome is not only unclear, but debatable. Another
example is that sometimes agents can fail to reach an agreement because of incor-
rect assumptions, or the fact that some of the assumptions of perfect rationality
cannot always be guaranteed for agents due to matters such as computational
resource constraints. In an attempt to address these problems work has been
done to create protocols for negotiation that allow more than just proposals to
be exchanged. This type of negotiation are referred to as Argumentation Based
Negotiations (ABN). This does, however, bring with it some unique challenges.
In addition to the challenges any agent should overcome, such as when to agree,
when to walk away, and generate bids. Rahwan et. al. [33] identify several other
challenges which argumentation based agents must also address:
– Message interpretation: In contrast to PBN a message in an ABN may or
may not contain, amongst others, a proposal, a rejection, an acceptation,
an argumentation for or against a fact, an assertion or anything else that
is allowed by the protocol specification used. All these possibilities need to
be parsed and differentiated so that they can be dealt with appropriately.
When I say message interpretation, that usually refers to the parsing of the
low-level symbols into a more semantic representation of the message. For
example, imagine that agents A and B are in an ABN. When A receives a
message containing the literal string "assert(isAlly,A,B)", then message
interpretation refers to the process of converting this string into an inter-
nal representation of the fact that B is asserting that A and B are allies
(whatever that may mean in context). This is more challenging than in the
PBN case since all of the possibilities mentioned above might have their
own associated symbols and/or grammar. For example, consider the dif-
ference between how the (arbitrary) messages "assert(isAlly,A,B)", and
"propose(yes,yes,no,4,3,no)" should be parsed. The first is an assertion
that can be accepted or rejected and the second is a proposal that has to
be considered in a very different way based on its utility. Several options for
communication standards are explored in [9].
– Message evaluation: In ABNs evaluating messages is no longer only limited
to calculating the utility of an offer, but must involve some form of reasoning.
For example take the example of "assert(isAlly,A,B)". First of all the
agent must decide whether to accept or reject this assertion and then the
agent must consider the implications and how it values those.
– Message generation: In addition to generating new proposals, an agent must
now also be able to generate new arguments and decide when it is appropriate
to do so.
– Belief revision: Although not technically necessary, a belief state is integral
to many forms of argumentation[1,33]. In addition to that, several authors
also note that incorporating belief revision into an agent has benefits, such as
being able to avoid non-agreement due to incorrect assumptions [9,28]. This
opens up a potential way of modelling credible commitment or assessing how
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likely it is an agent can and will make good on its agreements. This is an
avenue which is not explicitly addressed in the current literature.
ABN Protocols A defining trait of an ABN is that the protocol in some way
allows agents to express the reasoning behind a bid or rejection. In [33], Rahwan
et. al. mentions that in addition to the language ABN agents use to communi-
cate, they also often need a domain language to refer to concepts of the envi-
ronment which are relevant to the negotiation. One common standard protocol
is the FIPA ACL protocol [12,13,14], which is an architecture specification and
an associated protocol specification that attempts to promote inter-operability
between negotiation agents. FIPA ACL does not specify any domain language,
leaving the interpretation of the messages to the agent.
Some work has also been done by Luo et. al. in [25]. They propose a method
of negotiation based on the AOP protocol, but also develop mechanics to allow
agents to express fuzzy constraints to each other, which they can use to find
Pareto optimal solutions.
2.4 Negotiation and machine learning
Forms of opponent modelling Opponent modelling can aid an agent to
achieve better outcomes in a number of ways, but the most common ones are
being able to avoid exploitation by adapting to the opponent, minimising the cost
of negotiations and being able to reach win-win arguments. While the modelling
techniques mentioned below can be applied to any negotiation, their viability
depends more on details of the encounter such as the availability of relevant
data, or the representation of the preference profiles that agents use.
– Learning the acceptance strategy Having information about the acceptance
strategy of the opponent has a huge strategical advantage since it allows
an agent to look for the bid that the agent itself prefers the most which
is still acceptable to the opponent. However, this is often kept secret to
avoid exploitation. A popular way of learning the acceptation strategy is
estimating the acceptance probability, which is the probability that the agent
will accept any given proposal. Sometimes it can also be beneficial to model
the opponent’s deadline since that can reveal whether stall-tactics can be
effective or not [4].
– Learning the bidding strategy Having information about an opponent’s bid-
ding strategy and adjusting one’s own preference information accordingly
can be beneficial. For example, demanding higher concessions from agents
that are known to concede easily can lead to better outcomes. However, this
is a challenging task, especially since an agent’s strategy may not be static
over time. Time series forecasting is sometimes used to predict the future
behaviour of opponents [4].
Conversely, the aim of using an opponent model is usually to increase perfor-
mance, therefore it is also very popular to measure the difference in performance
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when using the model. For this any of the metrics outlined in Section 2.2 can be
used.
3 Reasoning about uncertainty
It is my belief that RAU provides methods of computation that can satisfy the
goals I have set out in the introduction of this piece. Therefore I will first give
a brief overview of the theory of probabilistic reasoning I intend to employ to
achieve those goals.
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3.1 DTProbLog
First order logic While a basic understanding of first order logic is assumed,
I will give a very brief overview of the used terminology.
– A constant is a symbol referring to a specific object such as 2 or bart
– A variable is a symbol referring to a wider variety of objects such as X or
Person Here I use the convention that logical constants start with a lower
case letter and logical variables start with an upper case letter.
– A functional expression is a functional constant, together with n terms called
its arguments enclosed in parenthesis and separated by commas. Here n is
called the arity of the function. For example if f is a functional constant
of arity 2 and a and Y are terms (to be defined below), then f(a,Y) is a
functional expression.
– A term is a variable, a constant or a functional expression.
– A literal is an atomic logical sentence, or its negation, such as p or ¬q.
– A clause is a disjunction of literals, such as p ∧ ¬q.
– A predicate is an assertion such as isFatherOf(homer,bart).
– An atom is a sentence consisting of a single predicate.
A logical expression is called ground if it contains no variables, i.e.
isFatherOf(X,bart) is not ground while isFatherOf(homer,bart) is.
A set of clauses is often referred to as either a program or a knowledge base
(KB). The set of all ground atoms occurring in a knowledge base KB is its
Herbrand base. A Herbrand interpretation is a mapping from a Herbrand base
onto the set of truth values {true, false}. Whenever a Herbrand interpretation
maps an atom or clause to true this interpretation is called a model for that
atom or clause. An interpretation is a model for a knowledge base if it is also a
model for every clause in that knowledge base [15]. For a knowledge base KB
and clause ϕ we say that KB logically entails or models ϕ if every model for
KB is also a model for ϕ, which is written as KB |= ϕ. Furthermore, if R is a
set of inference rules, and ϕ can be deduced using the rules in R from a set of
clauses called ∆, then we say that ϕ is provable in ∆, and we write ∆ `R ϕ or
often ∆ ` ϕ if R is understood. If ∆ |= ϕ holds whenever ∆ `R ϕ holds R is
called sound, which is to say that everything that is provable from a set is also
logically entailed by it. If the reverse always holds, R is called complete.
A substitution θ is a mapping from variables to terms. For example, let θ =
{X → homer, Y → bart} and ϕ = isFatherOf(X,Y) then we can apply θ to ϕ
which is denoted as ϕθ which results in isFatherOf(homer,bart). Note that
in this example ϕθ is ground. When this is the case, we call θ a grounding of ϕ
[16].
Prolog As mentioned in [34] Prolog is one of the most widely used logic pro-
gramming languages. A Prolog program is a set of definite or Horn clauses,
meaning sentences or clauses in first-order logic containing at most one positive
literal, such as u ∨ ¬p ∨ ¬q, which can be rewritten as (p ∧ q) → u. Here u is
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called the head of the clause and p∧q is called the body. In Prolog this is written
as
u : −p, q.
This can be read as “u if p and q”. As mentioned in [15] Prolog uses what
is called Selective Linear Definite clause resolution or SLD resolution, which is
both sound and complete for Horn clauses. However, it should be noted that
Prolog uses a depth-first search manner to search for proofs, and may therefore
not terminate for certain programs.
In the context of Prolog, a fact is a clause with an empty body. A rule is a
clause with a non-empty body.
ProbLog ProbLog [32] is a probabilistic extension of Prolog. We will assume
basic knowledge of Prolog in this work. For a more detailed instruction see for
example [15]. Where in pure Prolog one is commonly interested in whether a
given query fails or succeeds, in ProbLog one is focused on computing the prob-
ability that a query succeeds in a given ProbLog program. A ProbLog program
T = F ∪ BK consists of a set of labelled probabilistic facts F , and a set of
definite clauses BK called the background knowledge. Here, F is of the form
F = {p1 :: f1, . . . , pn :: fn} where fiθ is true with probability pi for all sub-
stitutions θ grounding fi. The probabilities of all the facts are assumed to be
independent. Furthermore, let FΘ denote the set of all possible ground instances
of the facts in F and let FL ⊂ FΘ. Then A ProbLog program defines a proba-
bility distribution of all the sub Prolog programs L = FL ∪BK via the following
identity:
P(L|T ) =
∏
fi∈FL
pi
∏
fi∈FΘ\FL
(1− pi) (7)
From that we can determine the success probability of a given query q using
the following identities:
P(q|L) =
{
1 ∃θ : L |= qθ
0 otherwise
(8)
P(q, L|T ) = P(q|L) · P(L|T ) (9)
P(q|T ) =
∑
M⊆LT
P(q,M |T ) (10)
So the probability of a query given a program is the probability of the query
having a proof in a randomly sampled subprogram according to the distribution.
DTProbLog DTProbLog [6] is an extension of ProbLog that allows for strategic
planning, given some quantified uncertainty by maximising the expected utility
of some actions.
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A DTProbLog program is of the form T = LT ∪D∪U , where LT is a ProbLog
program, D is the set of decision facts and U is the set of utility attributes.
Decision facts are of the form ? :: d where d is an atom and ? indicates that
it is a decision variable for which the program should optimise. A strategy σ
is a function σ : D → [0, 1] denoting the probabilities with which the agent
will assign that literal as true. For a set of decision facts D and a strategy σ the
following set is also defined: σ(D) = {σ(d) :: d|(? :: d) ∈ D}. Note that LT ∪σ(D)
is a standard ProbLog program and we will denoted it with σ(DT ).
Furthermore a utility attribute is a statement of the form ui → ri where ui
is a literal and ri is a numerical reward that will be awarded whenever ui is
satisfied. We then define the utility of a subprogram L as
Util(L) =
∑
(ui→ri)∈U
ri · P(ui|L) (11)
where P(ui|L) can be computed according to equation 8. Since a ProbLog pro-
gram T defines a probability distribution over the subprograms we can define
the expected utility of a program as
Util(T ) =
∑
(ui→ri)∈U
ri · P(ui|T ) (12)
This leads us to the definition of the utility of a single utility attribute ai
under a given strategy:
Util(ai|σ,DT ) = ri · P(ui|σ(DT )) (13)
and the total utility of a strategy
Util(σ,DT ) = Util(σ(DT )) =
∑
ai∈U
Util(ai|σ(DT )) (14)
So, in other words, the utility of a strategy is defined as the sum of the expected
utilities of all the utility attributes.
4 Future Work
4.1 An RAU implementation for better predictability of outcome
and broader awareness
As detailed in the introduction Baarslag et. al. identify in [5] that a lack of
predictable outcome to the user poses a major challenge to overcome to ensure
wider adoption of automated negotiations and NSS. Using probabilistic reason-
ing to implement negotiation agents provides a clear and inbuilt way of providing
that predictability, and also provides a way to incorporate a broader view of the
situation into the workings of an agent instead of only the issues pertaining to
the actual negotiation. It has already been seen in [27] that context awareness
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has advantages for negotiation agents. Applications using probabilistic reason-
ing methods such as ProbLog [32] could incorporate information from various
sensors, such as demonstrated by [39], to be incorporated in both bidding strate-
gies and opponent modelling. This could provide potentially huge advantages to
agents that are able to apply these concepts well.
4.2 Constrained proposal methods
Some work has already been done in [25] by Luo et. al. to incorporate fuzzy
constraints into a buyer-seller negotiation setting and found that it ensures that
agreements are Pareto optimal. In addition it also minimises the amount of in-
formation agents have to disclose, and improves the efficiency of the negotiations
over standard AOP settings. It has already been shown by [37] that incorporat-
ing very simple constraints into an AOP setting can significantly speed up the
negotiations without impacting the outcome. The authors did not test scenarios
with time discounted utility functions, more complex or perhaps “approximate”
constraints. If agents were to incorporate more sophisticated methods of discov-
ering constraints, reasoning about them and incorporating possible constraints
into bidding strategies, this would convey many opportunities to improve both
in terms of explainability and performance.
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